Ukraine’s Demographic Collapse: Myth or Reality?

Ukraine’s decision in April 2024 to lower the mobilisation age from 27 to 25 was framed abroad as evidence of collapse. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the bill at a time when the United Nations reported that Ukraine’s population had fallen by nearly 10 million since Russia’s invasion, about a quarter of its pre-war total. U.S. officials soon pressed Kyiv to consider reducing the fighting age further to 18. These moves were routine wartime adjustments, yet they became the foundation for claims that Ukraine’s demographics make victory impossible.

The demographic catastrophe narrative resonates because it looks like sober research rather than propaganda. Analysts and lawmakers point to real numbers showing Ukraine’s population shrinking, its workforce depleted and its military under strain. Framed as arithmetic, the myth suggests that no amount of Western support can compensate for the lack of people. This has influenced congressional debate in Washington and aid discussions in Brussels, offering opponents of continued funding an apparently objective reason to disengage.

The population loss is severe but not determinative. UN agencies estimated Ukraine’s population at about 37.9 million in 2024, while the OECD put those living in government-controlled areas at 33.4 million. These figures remain comparable to mid-sized European states. Historical precedents show that small nations have resisted larger powers: Finland confronted the Soviet Union in 1939 with only 3.7 million citizens; Israel fought larger Arab coalitions repeatedly from 1948; and Croatia achieved independence in the 1990s despite clear demographic disadvantages. Numbers alone did not dictate their survival, nor do they dictate Ukraine’s today.

Ukraine’s pool of fighting-age men also remains significant. CEPA analysis found that before February 2022 there were 8.7 million men of conscription age, falling to about 5 million by early 2024. RUSI reported that by July 2022 the defence forces had mobilised nearly one million personnel, most through the draft. These figures reveal strain but not exhaustion. Recruitment difficulties reflect the war’s dangers and political cost, not the disappearance of an eligible cohort. Russia, despite its larger base, faces the same legitimacy challenges in sustaining mobilisation.

Casualty figures are high but adaptation matters as much as raw losses. A CSIS assessment estimated that by mid-2025 Russia had suffered over one million casualties, including around 250,000 killed. Zelenskyy acknowledged in February 2025 that 45,100 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and 390,000 wounded. Ukraine has responded by restructuring its forces, rotating units more frequently, and investing heavily in drones and precision weapons. By late 2024, more than 96 % of drones used on the battlefield were produced domestically, with 1.3 million delivered out of 1.6 million contracted. In September 2025 Zelenskyy said nearly 60 % of weapons used by the armed forces were made in Ukraine. These shifts allow Ukraine to fight with greater efficiency, offsetting demographic limits through technology.

Displacement is another figure often misused. The UNHCR estimated in February 2025 that 6.8 million Ukrainians were refugees abroad and about 3.6 million were internally displaced. Europe hosted more than 6 million Ukrainians under temporary protection. Yet exile has not meant permanent loss. In 2024 remittances to Ukraine reached $9.6 billion, and in the first seven months of 2025 they still totalled $4.9 billion despite a decline. Many refugees remain engaged through remittances, political activism and periodic returns. Ukraine also draws on a diaspora of 25 million worldwide. Portraying these people as permanently removed from the national capacity ignores how modern wars sustain ties across borders.

The economy underscores resilience beyond demographics. After a contraction of one-third in 2022, Ukraine’s GDP rebounded 5.3 % in 2023. A joint assessment by the government, World Bank, EU and UN put reconstruction needs at $524 billion over the next decade. To sustain the war effort, Kyiv has scaled domestic arms production: European partners launched a €6 billion “drone alliance” in September 2025, and Ukrainian factories now produce millions of UAVs annually. Industrial capacity and financial flows, not population headcounts, are what keep the armed forces supplied.

The strategic risk lies in how the demographic myth is weaponised abroad. In April 2025 U.S. General Christopher Cavoli said Ukraine had solved many manpower shortages, but Vice President J.D. Vance and other officials continued to cite the lack of soldiers as a reason to question support. President Donald Trump told Zelenskyy that Ukraine was “running low on soldiers,” echoing Russian talking points. By recasting a complex mobilisation challenge as an inevitable defeat, the myth encourages Western leaders to scale back assistance. This risks creating the very outcome it predicts.

Ukraine’s demographic losses are real, but treating them as destiny is unsound. The state retains millions of fighting-age men, mobilised nearly a million troops, and has retooled its economy for wartime production. Refugees remain connected through remittances and may return as conditions improve. Above all, success depends on firepower, logistics and political will rather than population totals. The myth of demographic inevitability distorts data into defeatism. If adopted as policy, it could undermine Ukraine’s prospects more effectively than Russia’s army. Decision-makers should recognise that numbers alone do not decide wars.