Operational Security, Geolocation, and the Risks of Publishing Photos During Conflict

In the age of open-source intelligence (OSINT), every image tells a story—one that can be deciphered with startling accuracy in a matter of minutes. Whether it’s soldiers posing at a checkpoint or leaders visiting a strategic site, these photos are often goldmines for geolocation professionals. But this raises an important question: Are operational security (OpSec) measures keeping pace with geolocation capabilities when photos are shared during conflicts?

The Sinwar Site: A Case Study

A striking example is the recent Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operation where senior military personnel visited the site of Yahya Sinwar’s liquidation. Shortly after photos of the visit were published, OSINT professionals and amateur sleuths alike began dissecting every detail of the images. In just under an hour, the site was geolocated.

How? It came down to careful observation of what might seem like innocuous details:

• Height of Buildings: Analysts compared the height and layout of surrounding structures with satellite imagery of the area.

• Shadows and Time of Day: The length and direction of shadows in the photo helped determine the approximate time it was taken, narrowing down the possible geographic location.

• Unique Features: The color of a wall, the placement of debris, or even the angle of a road—tiny details that matched a specific location on Google Maps or other publicly available imagery.

The result was a precise identification of the site where Sinwar was killed, despite the IDF likely considering the area secure.

Other Examples

This isn’t the first time OpSec has been undermined by photos. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, social media posts from both sides frequently revealed troop positions, equipment locations, and even high-ranking meetings. For example:

• Russian Soldiers' Selfies: Early in the conflict, Russian soldiers posted selfies near Ukrainian villages. Analysts geolocated these posts using background features, compromising troop positions and movement.

• Drone Footage and Self-Identification: Ukraine has leveraged geolocated images from Russian media to guide artillery strikes, turning seemingly harmless images into actionable intelligence.

The Pros and Cons of Publishing Photos

Publishing images during conflict is a double-edged sword.

Pros:

1. Psychological Operations: Photos showing senior leaders visiting key sites or troops in high spirits can boost morale and signal strength to both allies and adversaries.

2. Public Relations: These images reassure domestic audiences, showing that their military is in control and engaged.

3. Propaganda: In the modern information war, optics are as important as operations, and images can sway public opinion.

Cons:

1. Geolocation Risks: As demonstrated, images can reveal sensitive locations in minutes, even if no coordinates are shared.

2. Pattern Recognition: Frequent postings can reveal patterns, such as regular meeting spots or high-value operational areas.

3. Loss of Initiative: Adversaries who identify the site or operation details can prepare countermeasures or use the information for propaganda.

Are Geolocation Capabilities Overlooked?

Given how quickly geolocation professionals identified the Sinwar site, one has to wonder if OpSec truly accounts for the speed and accuracy of modern OSINT techniques. The tools for geolocation—ranging from Google Earth to advanced AI-based image analysis—are readily available and growing more sophisticated by the day. Yet, in many cases, it seems that the decision to publish photos is based on short-term PR goals rather than long-term security considerations.

Take the IDF example: Was the decision to publish photos from the Sinwar site weighed against the likelihood of geolocation? Did it account for the potential risk of exposing sensitive details, such as nearby infrastructure or the routes taken to access the location?

The same question applies broadly to other conflicts. Even when images are released intentionally to provoke or mislead, adversaries often turn that information against its source.

Striking a Balance

The answer isn’t as simple as avoiding photo releases altogether. In conflicts where information warfare plays a critical role, visuals are powerful tools. However, military organizations must adapt their OpSec protocols to modern geolocation threats.

1. Blurred or Altered Images: Consider blurring backgrounds or altering non-essential details to obscure identifiable landmarks.

2. Delayed Releases: Publishing images only after operations are complete can minimize the risk of immediate exploitation.

3. Training and Awareness: Military personnel should be trained in OpSec basics, understanding how even casual photos can compromise security.

Final Thoughts

The case of Sinwar’s liquidation site—and the geolocation race that followed—serves as a stark reminder of how fast OSINT professionals can work. In the era of digital warfare, every image must be treated as a potential intelligence source, not just a snapshot in time.

The question remains: Are militaries, governments, and organizations ready to rethink their OpSec strategies in the face of ever-growing geolocation capabilities? If not, they may find themselves learning the hard way—one compromised site at a time.